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of a substantial part of his estate to his wife or other member of his
family and then leaves the residue to some stranger or charitable
organization. If the wife or member of the family predeceases him and
no change is made in the will, it would be hard to assume in the
majority of cases that his intention was that the lapsed gifts should
go to the residuary legatee to the detriment of his heirs at law. Second,
it is just as reasonable to suppose that the testator would have in-
tended for all of his heirs to share in such property rather than to
allow only one or two to receive a windfall.
The Kentucky statute requiring lapsed legacies and devises to go
to the heirs at law, thus contradicting the presumption against in-
testacy, seems to this writer to state a reasonable policy. The truth
in this type case is that the testator lacked sufficient foresight to an-
ticipate such an event, otherwise he surely would have made pro-
vision for it. Where no provision is made or intention is clearly ex-
pressed, it is reasonable for the legislature in furtherance of the public
interest to provide for the distribution of such property and for the
court to give full effect to that provision.
PAuL E. DEcaum
ADMISSIBILITY OF PAROL EVIDENCE
TO EXPLAIN AMBIGUITIES IN WILLS
A valid will may exist, yet, when the will is probated, it may be
discovered that because of the surrounding facts or circumstances, or
because of the wording upon the face of the will itself, the disposition
of the testator's property is uncertain. The purpose of this note is to
attempt a clarification of the rules governing the admissibility of evi-
dence to explain ambiguous terms in wills. Problems of admissibility
where fraud, mistake or undue influence is alleged will not be con-
sidered.
Where it is sought to employ parol evidence to explain a word or
term in a will, major policy considerations come into conflict. On the
one hand is the policy of giving effect to the testators intentions; on
the other, the policy against writing the will for the testator or giving
effect to an oral will. Where a devise or bequest is such that two
meanings may equally apply, it is reasonable to suppose that the
testator intended one of the two rather than neither; therefore, the
court should admit extrinsic evidence to determine and give effect to
the testator's intention. This, however, comes into conflict with the
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parol evidence rule, which represents an effort by the courts to prevent
fraud and perjury.1
I. Unambiguous Wills
In general parol evidence is inadmissible to vary or contradict a
written instrument.2 However, since the rule is so harsh in its applica-
lion, many exceptions to it have been developed by the courts.3 An
exception exists where the instrument is ambiguous. It follows that
where the will is unambiguous, it must be construed according to its
terms without the aid of extrinsic evidence.4 The instrument is un-
ambiguous vhen the words of the will are clear in themselves and re-
main clear when applied to the subject-matter to which the will relates.
Even though the language may seem ambiguous, no extrinsic
evidence is admissible where the will, under legal construction, could
have only one effect. Thus, where the testator provides for his "chil-
dren" and it is discovered that he has illegitimate children as well as
legitimate, no ambiguity exists because legally "children" means legiti-
mate children. Or, if the testator leaves property to his "heirs," parol
evidence is not admissible to explain the term since "heirs" has a
common-law technical meaning which includes only those persons
who would have taken the real property had the testator died in-
testate. However, if it appears on the face of the will that a word is
used other than in its legal sense, as where a will drawn by a layman
makes specific bequests to several people and then provides that the
"above heirs" shall share equally any funds remaining, and all of the
above named people are not heirs, the intention of the testator must
prevail, and the instrument will be construed in its popular sense.7
II. Ambiguous Wills
The courts have divided ambiguities into two categories, 8 latent
and patent. It is well established as a general rule that a latent
'Although research on this note was confined largely to cases involving wills,
it is generally held that the same rules are applicable to contracts and other writ-
ten instruments. 57 Amf. Jun. 676 (1939). However, some courts may apply a
stricter rule to wills. For example, see Smith v. Holder, 58 Kan. 535, 50 Pac. 447
(1897).
'3 WmSLiToN, CoNTRATs 1816 (Rev. Ed. 1938).
a For general exceptions see McKELEx, EVIDENCE 480-491 (4th ed. 1932).
'2 JoNns, EviENcE 861, 907 (4th ed. 1938).
5 Marquette v. Marquette's Ex'rs, 190 Ky. 182, 227 S.W. 157 (1921).
a Cambron v. Pattinger, 301 Ky. 768, 193 S.W. 2d 412 (1946).
7Jennings v. Jennings, 299 Ky. 779, 187 S.W. 2d 459 (1945).
' Difficulty arose in so many cases in determining whether an ambiguity was
latent or patent that a third category called "intermediate" was resorted to by
some courts. 20 Awf. Jum. 1011 (1939).
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ambiguity may be explained by extrinsic evidence, while a patent
ambiguity may not.9
A latent ambiguity arises when the writing on its face appears
clear and unambiguous, but there is some collateral matter which
makes the meaning ambiguous; that is, the ambiguity does not appear
upon the surface of the document but arises when inquiry is made
as to its application.' ° When an attempt is made to apply words to
existing facts, it may be found that the words refer equally to two or
more persons or objects. Thus, where a devise was to "the grand-
daughter of my brother," and the brother had several granddaughters,
parol evidence that testator knew of only one granddaughter was ad-
missible.". In Tudor v. Terrell,12 where the testator left to his widow
a number of slaves and from the list of names it appeared that there
were two named Phillis when in fact there was only one, extrinsic
evidence was admissible to show that there was a Phillip and that it
was testator's intention to give the widow both slaves. Similarly, in
Hurst v. Standard Oil Co.,'3 where the testator devised "all that piece
and parcel of land . . ." and the land referred to therein was in two
tracts, extrinsic evidence was admitted to show that testator intended
only one of the two tracts. The reason for allowing a latent ambiguity
to be explained by parol evidence seems to be that since the am-
biguity is raised by extrinsic circumstances, the same kind of evidence
should be admitted to remove the ambiguity.14
A patent ambiguity is one apparent on the face of the instrument
and arises by reason of inconsistency, obscurity, or an inherent un-
certainty of the language, so that the effect of the words is to convey
either no definite meaning or a double one.15 Where the words of a
document are in themselves indeterminative, the ambiguity is said to
be patent. Under the classic definition this was merely another way of
expressing the fact that the document was void upon its face for un-
certainty and no interpretation could be given to the words since
there was nothing to interpret.'6 However, the courts have not fol-
lowed this but instead have misused the term patent ambiguity and
applied the term to instruments where the words were uncertain yet
32 CJ.S. 915 (1942).
"For various ways that the courts have described latent ambiguities in wills
see 24 W. & P. 305-306 (Perm. Ed. 1940).
" Abbott v. Lewis, 77 N.H. 94, 88 AUt. 98 (1913).
"32 Ky. (2 Dana) 47 (1834).
"308 Ky. 779, 215 S.W. 2d 962 (1948).
"2 JoNEs, EVIDENCE 904 (4th ed. 1938); 32 C.J.S. 916 (1942); Cases cited
22 C.J. 1194, n. 12 (1920).
"For definitions of patent ambiguities in general see 31 W. & P. 418-419
(Penn. Ed. 1940).
" 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 241 (3rd ed. 1940).
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not too vague to be void for want of certainty. A devise to testator's
two sons "and at their death to their legal heirs" was said to con-
stitute a patent ambiguity since it was uncertain whether a fee or life
estate was intended to be devised. 17 Similary, a devise in "fee simple"
to testator's wife "to hold and possess during her natural life" was held
to constitute a patent ambiguity as to the status of the wife's estate. I8
It has also been held that a devise to plaintiff of five acres of land in
the north-west comer of the testator's farther field is an ambiguity
arising from the words of the will since it is not certain how the five
acres of the plaintiff is to be laid out.' 9 Cases have suggested that the
reason extrinsic evidence in excluded in case of a patent ambiguity is
that since the ambiguity appears upon the face of the instrument it
raises no question for the jury or for the aid of witnesses, but is a mat-
ter of interpretation for the court.20 This reasoning in itself indicates
that the courts have not followed the classic idea of patent ambiguity;
instead, the courts have thought of it as including any uncertainty ap-
pearing upon the face of the instrument. One can readily see the
great hardship encountered in applying the strict rule of not permitting
parol evidence in those cases where the ambiguity was minor and not
so uncertain that it could not be resolved. The fact that the courts
have not used the term patent ambiguity as it was at first intended to
be used may well suggest one reason why the rule has not only been
modified by the courts but also repudiated in a great number of juris-
dictions.
Even though, as a general rule, extrinsic evidence is not admissible
to explain a patent ambiguity, extrinsic evidence is admissible to place
the court in the testator's shoes to show circumstances surrounding
him at the time of the making of the will.21 Thus, the true rule as to
patent ambiguities is that if the ambiguity cannot be disposed of by a
construction of the will taking into account facts and circumstances
surrounding the testator at the time of execution, then the devise must
fail since other evidence may not be introduced to show the testators
intention.
[E]ven the courts which insist most strenuously upon the
distinction admit evidence of the surrounding facts and circumstances
which tend to put the court in the position of the testator.'
"
7Cummings v. Nunn, 290 Ky. 609, 162 S.W. 2d 218 (1942).
Smith v. Smith, 24 Ky. L. Rep. 1964, 72 S.W. 766 (1903).
'Pickering v. Pickering, 50 N.H. (2 Shirley) 849 (1870).
'Pickering v. Pickering, 50 N.H. (2 Shirley) 349 (1870); Nevius v. Martin,
80 N.J.L. (1 Vroom.) 465 (1864).
' Com. v. Manuel, 188 Ky. 48, 208 S.W. 329 (1919); Smith v. Smith, 24
Ky. L. Rep. 1964, 72 S.W. 766 (1903); 2 JoNs, EVIDENCE 864 (4th ed. 1938).
'4 PAGE, WMLs 653 (3rd ed. 1941). See also cases cited in 22 C.J. 1199
(1920).
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III. Limitations on Admissibility-Purpose and Character of Evidence
In case of a latent ambiguity, any evidence which in its nature and
effect simply explains what the testator has written, including evidence
of testators declarations of intent, is admissible. Evidence is not ad-
missible to show what the testator intended to say, but did not say.23
If the will, when applied to the subject matter in the light of the sur-
rounding circumstances, is free from ambiguity, extrinsic evidence is
not admissible to create an ambiguity or to create a doubt as to the
intention of the testator, or to raise an argument in favor of any par-
ticular construction. The purpose of the evidence is not to contradict
the meaning but to enable the court to place itself in the testator's
shoes and see things as he saw them when the will was made.24 The
function of the court is to interpret and not to correct mistakes or to
create a new will. Where parol evidence is admitted to explain a
latent ambiguity, its function is limited in that it may only be used to
explain the doubtful expressions. 25
Even though an ambiguity exists, no extrinsic evidence will be
admitted if the court can interpret the meaning from all the language
in the will.26 In the case of Muth v. Goings,27 the testator bequeathed
property to the "children of my late wife" and to the "children of my
present wife" and then provided that a farm be sold "and proceeds
divided equally amongst my present wife and children." If he had
said "my present wife and her children," no difficulty would have
arisen. As it was, however, the court held that the word "children"
constituted an ambiguity since the word was qualified elsewhere
throughout the will as children "of my late wife" or "of my present
wife." Extrinsic evidence was not admitted to show that the testator
was on unfriendly terms with the children of his first wife since if the
testator had intended only the children of his second wife to have the
proceeds from the sale of the farm, the natural thing to have done
would have been for him to have used the word "her" before the
word "children." Since the testator had not done this the court held
that all the children should share in the proceeds.
Where the words in a will clearly apply to a particular person or
thing, no latent ambiguity can be established by showing an intention
' Deboe v. Brown, 231 Ky. 682, 22 S.W. 2d 111 (1929).
4 PAGE, WrrLs 655 (3rd ed. 1941).
=Stephen v. Walker, 47 Ky. (8 B. Mon.) 600 (1848); 2 JoN-s, EviDENCE
908 (4th ed. 1938).
Parrott v. Crosby, 179 Ky. 658, 201 S.W. 13 (1918).
27199 Ky. 321, 250 S.W. 995 (1923). For other cases where the Kentucky
Court cleared up the ambiguity by other language in the will see Ratliff v. Yost,
263 Ky. 239, 92 S.W. 2d 95 (1936)3 Threlkelds' Ex'rs v. Synodical Presbyterian
Orphanage of Anchorage, 307 Ky. 235, 210 S.W. 2d 766 (1948).
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that the words apply to another person or object of a different descrip-
tion or name. Thus, where a bequest was made to "the Seaman's Aid
Society" and there was a society of that exact name in the testator's
city, extrinsic evidence could not be introduced to show that the
testator had no knowledge of the Seaman's Aid Society, but did know
of the Seaman's Friend Society.28 But, if a bequest is made to the
"Old Lady's Home" and there is no "Old Lady's Home", extrinsic
evidence is admissible to identify the institution intended to be de-
scribed.29 Where a bequest is made to "Ollie", extrinsic evidence is
admissible to show that "Viola" was known to the testator as "Ollie."30
In Eichhorn v. Morat,3' where there was a devise to "he" without in-
dication as to which "he" was intended, the court admitted proof
that the testatrix was a German woman and that German women
habitually refer to their husbands by the masculine personal pronoun
and therefore that "my husband" was the unexpressed antecedent of
"he."
Generally, the declarations of the testator are not admissible.3 2
However, in case of a latent ambiguity declarations are admissible to
show which property was intended to be conveyed or to whom it was
intended to go.33 An excellent statement of the rule appears in Car-
roll v. Cave Hill Cemetery Co. where the court said:
When a latent ambiguity exists in a will, it is permissible to
prove the declarations of the testator made at the time or about the
time of the execution of the will for the purpose of identifying the
objects or persons upon which it is intended that the will should
operate, and the facts and circumstances, which surround the testator
at the time of the making of the will, in order to explain the lan-
guage of the will and to assist the court in determining his inten-
tions0'
The tendency of the courts has been to abolish the distinction
between latent and patent ambiguities altogether and to admit parol
evidence of testator's intentions to explain the ambiguity whether
latent or patent.3 5 In some jurisdictions this has been accomplished
'Tucker v. Seaman's Aid Soc., 7 Met. 188 (Mass. 1843).
'Ladies Benev. Soc. v. Orrell, 195 N.C. 405, 142 S.E. 493 (1928). Some
courts may go further than this as did the court in the case of Mosely v. Good-
man, 138 Tenn. 1, 195 S.W. 590 (1917), where parol evidence was admitted to
show that a devise to "Mrs. M" was intended for "Mrs. T," whom the testator
generally called "Mrs. M," even though there was a claimant who really bore
the name of Mrs. M.
'Wilson v. Stevens, 59 Kan. 771, 51 Pac. 903 (1898).
'1175 Ky. 80, 193 S.W. 1018 (1917).
" White v. Ponder, 180 Ky. 386, 202 S.W. 867 (1918).
'2 JoNEs, EvinxmEC 915-916 (4th ed. 1938); 9 WIGMORE, EVMENcE 288
(3rd ed. 1940).
172 Ky. 204, 213, 189 S.W. 186, 190 (1916).
82 JoNEs, EVIDENCE 917 (4th ed. 1938); 20 AM. Jun. 1009, 1011 (1939);
32 C.J.S. 919 (1942).
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by statute.36 Williston believes that the distinction restricting admissi-
bility of evidence in case of a patent ambiguity may be disregarded
except possibly in the case of wills.37 As early as 1861 the Georgia
Court in the case of Armistead v. Armistead expressed its dissatisfac-
tion with the distinction when the court said:
[Tihe distinction between latent and patent ambiguities,
when examined, is wholly unpbilosophical, and founded upon a scho-
lastic quibble of Lord Bacon...
Page, in his treatise on wills says:
[I]t undoubtedly would be a step in advance in the de-
velopment of our law to discard the distinction entirely.'
The Kentucky court, at a time when Kentucky was still recognizing
the distinction, said in Eichhorn v. Morat:
The cardinal rule which should always guide the courts in
their investigations of controversies is to ascertain the facts and apply
the law applicable thereto. The modem tendency is toward relaxing
the ancient strict technical rules with their hampering effects, and to
lift the curtains of the court house so as to let in the light of
truth .... 40
The 1933 Kentucky case of Thomas' Eer v. Marksbury4l involved
a devise to the testator's daughter which provided that a home should
be bought for her and deeded to her. Since the amount to be paid
for the home was not stated, the will was held to be ambiguous.
However, the court spoke only of it as an ambiguity and labeled it
neither latent nor patent. Such an ambiguity on the face of the will
was clearly patent; nevertheless, the court not only admitted evidence
of the testator's surroundings but also considered evidence that the
testator had frequently declared that he wanted $3,000 or $4,000 in-
vested in a home for his daughter. Thus, the Kentucky court in the
Thomas case reached the better result inadvertently, since at that time
the latent and patent distinction was still being recognized in Ken-
tucky, and, if the question had been put in issue, the court would
most likely have excluded the evidence as to the testator's declara-
tions. In 1949, the Kentucky court in Hoge v. Street4 admitted parol
evidence to explain an ambiguity in a will, saying that it was unneces-
sary to determine whether the ambiguity was latent or patent. Thus,
See, McMillan v. McCoy, 175 Ga. 699, 165 S.E. 604 (1932).tmWmLwLIsoN, CoNTmArs 1800 (Rev. Ed. 1936).
32 Ga. 597, 601 (1861).
"4 PAGE, WMLs 654 (Ord ed. 1941).
,o175 Ky. 80, 86, 193 S.W. 1013, 1015 (1917).
249 Ky. 629, 61 S.W. 2d 282 (1933).$'810 Ky. 370, 220 S.W. 2d 830 (1949).
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it would seem that the Kentucky court had abandoned the distinction.
However, in 1950, the Kentucky court in the case of Miller v. Trigg
County Farmers Bank43 excluded evidence on the ground that no
latent ambiguity existed. At first glance such language might leave
one with the impression that the Kentucky court had regressed to the
old distinction between latent and patent ambiguities. Still, the above
case did not involve a patent ambiguity; rather, the problem involved
was whether the children of a devisee who had received an option to
purchase part of the remaining property could exercise the option.
It is suggested that the courts should avoid using labels as patent
and latent and make it clear that ambiguities, regardless of character,
may be explained, if explanation is possible, by parol evidence. It is
suggested that the courts take a firm stand whenever possible to re-
pudiate the distinction between the types of ambiguities. The Ken-
tucky court has laid a firm foundation for such a stand by refusing to
recognize the distinction in the Hoge case. It is merely suggested that
the language employed in the Miller case should be avoided lest some
be led to believe that extrinsic evidence may be considered only when
a latent ambiguity is present. If the words in a will are so vague as to
be held void for want of certainty then the court should so state; if
not, any extrinsic evidence, including declarations of the testator made
at or about the time of the drawing of the will, should be admitted to
resolve any minor uncertainty which might be present.
It is submitted that the modem treatment of the question by the
Kentucky court is the correct approach. No conflict with the parol
evidence rule will be encountered since that rule excludes evidence
tending to vary or contradict a written instrument; whereas the rule
contended for here would merely admit evidence in order to explain
rather than contradict the instrument. The policy of giving effect to
the not-too-clear intent of the testator seems to outweigh the slight
risk of fraud or perjury. Where the true intention of the testator in an
ambiguous will can be clarified by otherwise acceptable proof there is
no reason, either in law or logic, to exclude that proof.
PAUL E. DECKER
"312 Ky. 321, 227 S.W. 2d 429 (1950).
